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1 .  R U L E S  G O V E R N I N G 
T R A N S F E R  P R I C I N G
1.1 Statutes and Regulations
Preliminary Remarks
In Switzerland, transfer pricing issues arise 
mainly in connection with the federal and can-
tonal corporate income taxes and the federal 
withholding tax law. With respect to corporate 
income tax, it should be noted that cantons have 
the authority not only to assess the cantonal and 
municipal but also the federal corporate income 
tax. This means that the cantons can issue 
advance rulings (so-called tax rulings), in par-
ticular also with regard to federal income taxes. 
However, the Federal Tax Administration (FTA) 
exercises an important supervisory function over 
the cantons and can also intervene in individual 
cases. In practice, it can be seen that the FTA is 
becoming increasingly involved in discussions, 
especially in large transfer pricing cases. 
While in the area of corporate income tax there 
is a parallel competence of the federal govern-
ment and the cantons, the federal government 
has the exclusive competence to levy withhold-
ing tax, stamp duties and value added tax. In 
the area of withholding tax, the FTA established 
a competence centre for transfer pricing in 2019. 
It is, hence, no surprise that in practice it can 
already be seen that transfer prices are increas-
ingly being critically scrutinised during tax audits 
from a withholding tax perspective as well. This 
applies, in particular, in connection with the 
relocation of functions abroad and in the case 
of controlled transactions between Swiss com-
panies and related companies domiciled in tax 
havens or low-tax countries. 
As far as legislation in the field of transfer pricing 
is concerned, it should be noted that there are 
no specific regulations on the determination and 
documentation of transfer prices, neither at the 
federal level nor at the cantonal level. 
One major reason for the lack of specific transfer 
pricing rules is that Switzerland has compara-
tively low corporate income tax rates and, in the 
past, there has generally been little incentive for 
Swiss-based companies to shift profits abroad. 
A second reason is that Switzerland, as a mem-
ber state of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), adheres to 
the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD’s 
TPG). Switzerland has accepted the initial ver-
sion and all updates of the OECD’s TPG without 
reservation. There is now full consensus in Swiss 
tax law practice that the OECD’s TPG are an 
important interpretative tool for the application 
of the at arm’s-length principle in Swiss tax law.
In exercising its supervisory role over the can-
tonal tax administrations, the FTA instructed 
the cantonal tax administrations in 1997 and 
2004 with a circular letter to directly apply the 
OECD’s TPG. The Federal Supreme Court (FSC) 
tends to apply a static approach regarding the 
version of the OECD’s TPG. Hence, the arm’s-
length principle and the methods to determine 
the transfer prices will be assessed according 
to the OECD’s TPG as they were published at 
the time the transaction in question was settled. 
Statutes
Overview
Even though transfer pricing issues arise primar-
ily regarding corporate income and withholding 
tax, stamp duties and VAT must always be ana-
lysed as well in a comprehensive transfer pricing 
advice.
Corporate income tax
From a corporate income tax perspective, the 
following two scenarios must be distinguished: 
(i) controlled transactions between the corpo-
ration and its shareholders, and (ii) controlled 
transactions between other related parties. 
The latter includes, in particular, transactions 
between group companies that are under the 
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same management and control. In both situa-
tions, the arm’s-length principle is to be applied. 
Under Swiss law, a tax authority may make an 
adjustment only if the following three conditions 
are met:
• the company received evidently no adequate 
compensation for its services or deliveries;
• the compensation in question was in favour of 
the shareholder or a related party and would 
not have been provided to unrelated parties 
at the same conditions; and
• the evident discrepancy between the ser-
vice or delivery and the compensation was 
recognisable for the company or the persons 
representing the company.
The first two conditions concern the question 
of whether the agreed transfer prices fall within 
the range of prices that independent third par-
ties would have agreed on for the services or 
goods received. The third condition, however, 
is a Swiss peculiarity: the tax authority may only 
make an adjustment if the violation of the at 
arm’s-length principle is obvious and thus rec-
ognisable for the management or the board of 
directors. This has to be determined on the basis 
of the concrete facts and circumstances of the 
case at hand. 
If profits are shifted from the subsidiary to the 
parent company due to an obvious violation of 
the arm’s-length principle, there is a deemed div-
idend. The tax authority is authorised to adjust 
the profit of the subsidiary. In addition, income 
is attributed to the shareholder to the extent of 
the deemed dividend. If, on the other hand, the 
violation of the arm’s-length principle leads to an 
increase of income at the level of the subsidiary, 
there is a so-called informal capital contribution. 
The tax treatment of such an informal capital 
contribution at the level of the shareholder and 
the beneficiary company depends on the facts 
and circumstances of the case.
If the contracting parties of a transaction vio-
lating the arm’s-length principle are sister com-
panies, the so-called modified triangle theory 
applies. In a first step, the profit of the company 
that has distributed a deemed divided is adjust-
ed. In a second step, the benefit is attributed 
to the shareholder, which in turn makes a hid-
den capital contribution to the beneficiary sister 
company. 
Withholding tax
The hidden profit distributions described above, 
which result from the violation of the arm’s-
length principle, regularly also trigger withhold-
ing tax consequences for the company that has 
distributed the deemed dividend. 
Under Swiss law, withholding tax of 35% must 
be passed on to the recipient of the deemed 
dividend. The taxable company must therefore, 
in principle, reclaim the withholding tax from the 
beneficiary company. Unlike in the case of cor-
porate income tax, it is not the triangular theory 
that applies, but the direct beneficiary theory. 
In the case of payments to sister companies, 
this means that the reimbursement must be 
requested by the beneficiary sister company. If 
it is not possible to pass on the withholding tax, 
the deemed dividend is grossed up and the ben-
eficiary is deemed to have effectively received 
only 65% of the deemed dividend. The corpora-
tion that provided the deemed dividend is there-
fore liable for the payment of the remaining 35%. 
This gross-up results in an effective withholding 
tax rate of 53.8% of the tax adjustment. 
Foreign beneficiaries may request a full or partial 
refund of the withholding tax based on the appli-
cable double taxation agreement (DTA). Howev-
er, the application of the direct beneficiary theory 
regularly limits the treaty relief in cases where the 
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direct beneficiary is not the direct shareholder. 
The law entitles companies to fulfil the withhold-
ing tax liability by notification instead of paying if 
specific conditions are met. In practice, however, 
the application of the notification procedure in 
the case of deemed dividends is granted only 
very reluctantly. If the notification procedure is 
not possible, not only the full withholding tax but 
also an interest on late payment of 5% will be 
due.
Stamp tax duty
In the case of stamp duties, the arm’s-length 
principle is only applied in certain cases. In 
principle, as in the case of withholding tax, the 
direct beneficiary theory also applies to the 
stamp duty. This means that only hidden capi-
tal contributions made directly by shareholders 
to the corporation are subject to the 1% stamp 
duty. In particular, this has the consequence 
that contributions to sister companies do not 
trigger stamp duty. Also, no stamp duty is trig-
gered for so-called benefits periodically granted 
to the subsidiary, as is the case, for example, if 
the shareholder charges an interest rate that is 
too low according to the arm’s-length principle 
for the loan granted to the subsidiary.
Value added tax
The Federal VAT Act, in contrast to the above-
mentioned legislation, explicitly states that 
transactions between related parties have to 
be at arm’s length. For VAT purposes, a related 
party is to be assumed if a shareholder holds 
at least 20% of the nominal share capital or an 
equivalent participation, or in the case of foun-
dations and associations with which there is a 
particularly close economic, contractual or per-
sonal relationship.
Regarding the determination of the arm’s-length 
transfer prices for VAT purposes, it can gener-
ally be referred to the principles applicable for 
corporate income tax. Though, according to 
administrative practice in specific cases, the 
arm’s-length price can be calculated on a lump-
sum basis. If, for example, a holding company 
does not have its own personnel to effectively 
manage the holding company and that manage-
ment is carried out by personnel of its subsidiar-
ies, the at arm’s-length remuneration can be set 
at 2 or 3‰ of the average total assets held by 
the holding company.
Administrative Guidelines
As already set out, the FTA instructed the can-
tonal tax administrations by circular letter of 
1997, which was renewed in 2004, to directly 
apply the OECD’s TPG. Said circular explicitly 
states that the mark-ups for service companies 
must be determined in accordance with the 
arm’s-length principle; ie, for each individual 
case on the basis of comparable uncontrolled 
transactions and with reference to the range of 
appropriate margins.
The most relevant administrative guidelines in 
Switzerland in the area of transfer pricing can 
be seen in the circulars published by the FTA 
providing safe harbour rules for thin capitalisa-
tion and for intra-group interest rates (see 11.1 
Transfer Pricing Safe Harbours) where the 
arm’s-length principle is not adhered to.
1.2 Current Regime and Recent 
Changes
Overview
As Switzerland adheres to the OECD’s TPG and 
has not established specific transfer pricing 
rules, the current regime and its development 
are, in general, reflected by the OECD’s TPG. 
However, the arm’s-length principle was already 
acknowledged before the first OECD TPG were 
published. Hence, in the matter of Bellatrix SA, 
the FSC confirmed in 1981 that for withholding 
tax purposes, the arm’s-length principle is appli-
cable with regard to transactions concerning the 
company’s shareholders.
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Nevertheless, it has to be noted that in recent 
years Switzerland used to apply a rather prag-
matic approach when it came to the applica-
tion of the arm’s-length principle. For instance, 
the FTA published in 2001 the so-called 50-50 
practice, according to which, foreign-controlled 
trading companies being predominantly active 
abroad could set off 50% of their gross earn-
ings as commissions or provisions to related 
or third parties. This practice was abolished in 
mid-2005. 
Until recently, the FTA also maintained a prac-
tice for Swiss finance branches and principal 
companies. According to these practices, part 
of the earnings of the Swiss companies was not 
taxed. In the case of the Swiss finance branch-
es, Swiss permanent establishments of foreign 
companies, a notional interest was calculated on 
the capital made available to the branch, which 
reduced the taxable profit in Switzerland. With 
regard to principal companies, the practice of 
the FTA allowed the partial apportionment of the 
earnings abroad, thus exempting part of the net 
profit from taxation. In the course of the com-
prehensive corporate tax reform, these practices 
have been abolished as of the beginning of 2019.
Recent Changes
Until recently, core transfer pricing issues were 
only seldomly touched by the tax administra-
tions. Not least due to the BEPS project, transfer 
pricing issues increasingly form part of routine 
audits. Hence, in recent years, taxpayers have 
been more often confronted with detailed ques-
tions regarding transfer pricing matters (eg, 
requests regarding detailed transfer pricing doc-
umentation and explanations concerning com-
parables). In international cases, the main focus 
is on the transfer of functions, the transfer of 
intellectual property rights, financial transactions 
and asset management services. Transactions 
with foreign companies in low-tax jurisdictions, 
in particular, attract the tax authorities’ attention. 
2 .  D E F I N I T I O N  O F 
C O N T R O L / R E L AT E D 
PA R T I E S
2.1 Application of Transfer Pricing 
Rules
Swiss tax law does not include an explicit defini-
tion of the terms “associated enterprises”, “relat-
ed parties” or “controlled transactions”.
According to the FSC, related parties are to be 
considered as entities with close commercial 
or personal relationships, whereas any close 
relationship between the parties involved in the 
transaction is enough. According to the Swiss 
understanding of the term of related parties, 
direct or indirect control (participation in man-
agement or capital) for itself is not decisive. The 
crucial question is if the tested transaction was 
conducted under the given conditions only as 
a consequence of the associated relationship 
or not. In practice, some cantonal tax admin-
istrations tend to apply the definition of “asso-
ciated entities” set forth by the OECD. Further, 
according to the FSC, “associated enterprises” 
or “related parties” can be assumed if the condi-
tions agreed upon by the involved parties appar-
ently do not meet the at arm’s-length standard. 
3 .  M E T H O D S  A N D 
M E T H O D  S E L E C T I O N  A N D 
A P P L I C AT I O N
3.1 Transfer Pricing Methods
Swiss domestic tax laws or practices do not 
provide specific transfer pricing methods. But 
as Switzerland adheres to the OECD’s TPG, all 
the usual transfer pricing methods are admis-
sible. However, according to the FTA circular of 
2004, the cost plus method is, in general, not to 
be seen as an appropriate method for financial 
services or management functions.
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3.2	 Unspecified	Methods
As Switzerland adheres to the OECD’s TPG 
and the Guidelines do not exclude the use of 
unspecified methods, such methods can indeed 
be applied. 
However, if an unspecified method is intended to 
be applied, as the Guidelines specify, it should 
be explained why the methods described by 
the Guidelines themselves are not considered 
appropriate for the case at hand.
3.3 Hierarchy of Methods
In accordance with the OECD’s TPG, Switzer-
land does not have a specific hierarchy of the 
methods described in the Guidelines. The most 
appropriate method should be used. However, 
the three traditional methods – ie, the compara-
ble uncontrolled price (CUP) method, the resale 
price method and the cost plus method – are still 
preferred by the tax administrations. Further, the 
CUP method enjoys preference over the other 
two traditional methods. In practice, however, 
the transactional net margin method is the most 
commonly used method in Switzerland to deter-
mine transfer prices. 
It is to be noted that the hierarchy of transfer 
pricing methods as it was stipulated in the older 
versions of the OECD’s TPG can still be of rel-
evance. This is due to a static approach to the 
application of the Guidelines that means that the 
version of the Guidelines in effect at the time the 
transaction was settled is applied (see also 1.1 
Statutes and Regulations).
It is sometimes difficult, though, to assess 
whether an update of the OECD’s TPG can be 
considered merely a more detailed explana-
tion of the existing principles or a change in the 
guiding principles. If this is the case, a dynamic 
approach to the application of the Guidelines is 
permissible as well. 
3.4 Ranges and Statistical Measures
The use of statistical tools that consider central 
tendency, such as the interquartile range or other 
percentiles, is not required. However, in practice, 
such tools are usually used to narrow the range. 
With regard to the determination of the adequate 
transfer prices, the tax authorities generally con-
sider the interquartile range as the arm’s-length 
remuneration.
3.5 Comparability Adjustments
Swiss domestic tax laws do not provide specific 
guidance on comparable adjustments. Howev-
er, the OECD’s TPG on how and when to apply 
comparability adjustments is applicable.
4 .  I N TA N G I B L E S
4.1 Notable Rules
Swiss domestic tax laws do not provide specific 
guidance on the pricing of controlled transac-
tions involving intangibles. Rather, the OECD’s 
TPG are to be consulted regarding transfer pric-
ing of intangibles.
4.2 Hard-to-Value Intangibles
In general, due to the adherence to the OECD’s 
TPG, the OECD’s approach regarding hard-
to-value intangibles is considered by the tax 
authorities to be applicable in Switzerland as 
well.
However, there is controversy as to whether this 
approach is, in fact, applicable, since it seems 
to collide with long-standing case law and the 
tax laws themselves. In particular, the question is 
whether or not ex post data can influence open 
or final tax assessments. 
Open Tax Assessments
If a tax assessment is not yet final, a transfer 
pricing adjustment requires, inter alia, an obvi-
9
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ous mismatch between the value of the trans-
ferred intangible and the compensation received, 
and that this mismatch was recognisable for the 
persons in charge (see 1.1 Statutes and Regu-
lations). This mismatch is evaluated ex ante, 
namely at the time the transaction was settled. 
The hard-to-value intangibles (HTVI) approach, 
however, assesses the conditions of the trans-
action ex post and does not provide an answer 
to whether a potential mismatch was ex ante 
already obvious and, thus, recognisable. Hence, 
the HTVI approach does not seem to fit into pre-
existing domestic law and the respective case 
law. So far, however, there is no precedent on 
this issue.
Final Tax Assessments
If a tax assessment is already final and legally 
binding, an adjustment is generally only possi-
ble if the tax administration becomes aware of 
new facts or evidence. As long as the taxpayer 
provided the tax administration with appropriate 
and correct transfer pricing documentation dur-
ing the assessment relating to the ex ante valu-
ation of the intangible in question, the adminis-
tration is not entitled to come back to its own 
evaluation should it ex post turn out that the 
value of the intangible is, in fact, higher. In this 
case, the ex post data would not qualify as new 
fact or evidence to reopen and change the final 
tax assessment. 
4.3 Cost Sharing/Cost Contribution 
Arrangements
Switzerland recognises cost contribution 
arrangements and applies the OECD’s TPG cor-
respondingly. However, Switzerland does not 
have special rules that apply to such arrange-
ments.
5 .  A F F I R M AT I V E 
A D J U S T M E N T S
5.1	 Rules	on	Affirmative	Transfer	
Pricing Adjustments
Switzerland does not have specific rules regard-
ing affirmative transfer pricing adjustments. In 
general, pursuant to Swiss tax law, the financial 
statements prepared in accordance with com-
mercial law are, in principle, binding for tax pur-
poses. The tax administrations can only deviate 
from the financial statements in order to deter-
mine the taxable base if the statements violate 
accounting principles as set forth in the federal 
Code of Obligations or specific rules of the tax 
law require an adjustment.
However, as long as the tax return had not yet 
been filed by the taxpayer, the balance sheet 
can, in accordance with the Code of Obligations, 
be adjusted without further restrictions. Once 
the tax return has been filed, however, accord-
ing to case law, a balance sheet adjustment is 
only permissible if it violates commercial law. If 
a transfer pricing issue arises later that makes a 
proactive adjustment of the balance sheet nec-
essary, an adjustment, in principle, will only be 
allowed if the original transfer prices also violate 
commercial law. 
But as long as the adjustment increases the tax-
able profit, the tax administrations are nonethe-
less likely to accept such adjustments, even if 
the original transfer prices were in line with the 
accounting principles as set forth in the federal 
Code of Obligations. This is due to the fact that 
if a transaction is not conducted according to 
the arm’s-length principle, the tax administration 
can make the respective adjustments (see Arti-
cle 58 paragraph 1 of the Federal Act on Direct 
Federal Taxation, or FDTA, and Article 24 para-
graph 1 of the Federal Act on the Harmonisation 
of Direct Taxes, or FTHA). 
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Neither transfer pricing-specific returns nor 
related-party disclosures along with the corpo-
rate income tax return are required to be filed.
6 .  C R O S S - B O R D E R 
I N F O R M AT I O N  S H A R I N G
6.1 Sharing Taxpayer Information
Exchange of Information on Request
In 2009, Switzerland committed to the interna-
tionally agreed standard regarding the exchange 
of information on request. By doing so, Switzer-
land renewed most of its more than 100 DTAs. 
Moreover, in 2016, Switzerland ratified the Mul-
tilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters, extending the net-
work of jurisdictions to exchange information 
even further. Currently, Switzerland has imple-
mented the legal basis for exchange of informa-
tion on request with around 140 jurisdictions. In 
addition, Switzerland has signed ten tax infor-
mation exchange agreements.
Practice shows that foreign tax authorities are 
increasingly submitting requests for adminis-
trative assistance to Switzerland when auditing 
transfer prices. Under current law, administrative 
assistance may only be provided if the request-
ing state demonstrates in its request that the 
information requested is foreseeably relevant 
and confirms that it will treat the requested 
information confidentially. Administrative assis-
tance may be refused if the information is to be 
used for taxation contrary to the DTA or if the 
requested information could not be obtained 
by the Swiss tax authorities under domestic tax 
procedural law. 
Spontaneous Exchange of Information on 
Specific Tax Rulings
In December 2015, the Swiss Parliament 
approved the OECD/Council of Europe Conven-
tion on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters (MAC). The MAC entered into force for 
Switzerland as of 1 January 2017 and laid the 
legal foundation concerning the automatic, as 
well as the spontaneous, exchange of informa-
tion. According to the minimum standard defined 
in Action 5 of the BEPS project, it is incumbent 
on states to spontaneously exchange informa-
tion on tax rulings in cross-border situations. 
Switzerland has implemented the spontane-
ous exchange of information on tax rulings into 
domestic law as of 1 January 2017. In particu-
lar, it has also committed to the spontaneous 
exchange of unilateral rulings on transfer pric-
ing and permanent establishments with the state 
of the direct parent, the state of the group top 
company and, if available, the state of the coun-
terparty of the transaction.
Automatic Exchange of Information on 
Country-by-Country Reports (CbCRs)
In 2016, Switzerland also signed the Multilat-
eral Competent Authority Agreement on the 
Exchange of Country-by-Country Reports, 
which entered into force on 1 January 2017. 
Apart from voluntary CbCRs, the first reports 
had to be prepared for 2018 and information was 
first exchanged in 2020 with around 60 states. 
These countries include all the EU states, but 
also emerging economies such as Indonesia and 
Brazil, as well as developing countries such as 
Pakistan and Kazakhstan. Switzerland does not 
exchange CbCRs with the USA. 
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7 .  A D V A N C E  P R I C I N G 
A G R E E M E N T S
7.1 Programmes Allowing for Rulings 
Regarding Transfer Pricing
Unilateral Rulings 
Switzerland has a long-standing practice regard-
ing the issuance of unilateral rulings. This prac-
tice also includes the issuance of unilateral 
transfer pricing rulings. These rulings may be 
subject to the spontaneous exchange of infor-
mation (see also 6.1. Sharing Taxpayer Infor-
mation).
Advance Pricing Agreements
In Switzerland, advance pricing agreements 
(APAs) are available. APAs have become a 
favoured option for Swiss-based international 
groups with complex or high-volume transac-
tions. In practice, the procedure starts with a 
presentation of the facts and a formal request 
to the State Secretariat for International Finance 
(Staatssekretariat für internationale Finanzfragen, 
or SIF), the competent authority in Switzerland.
In 2019, 105 APA proceedings were opened 
and 46 of the pending APA proceedings have 
been closed. The SIF has published guidance on 
mutual agreement procedures (MAPs) and APAs. 
7.2 Administration of Programmes
With regard to bi- and multilateral APA proce-
dures, the competent authority in Switzerland is 
the SIF. 
Concerning unilateral transfer pricing rulings for 
corporate income tax purposes, the cantonal tax 
administrations and the FTA will be the compe-
tent authorities.
7.3 Co-ordination between the APA 
Process and Mutual Agreement 
Procedures
Since the SIF is also the competent authority 
for mutual agreement, co-ordination between a 
MAP and APA procedures is ensured.
7.4 Limits on Taxpayers/Transactions 
Eligible for an APA
In principle, the APA programme is open for all 
taxpayers that engage in cross-border intra-
group transactions.
7.5 APA Application Deadlines
The application for an APA procedure can be 
filed at any given time, including after an audit.
7.6 APA User Fees
Under current practice, APA procedures and 
MAPs are free of charge. This may change in 
the future.
7.7	 Duration	of	APA	Cover
In practice, an APA will cover three to five years. 
However, Switzerland does not have specific 
time limitations an APA may or may not cover. 
Rather, the time period to be covered by an APA 
has to be decided depending on the characteris-
tics of the particular case at hand and is subject 
to negotiations. Hence, the duration is typically a 
trade-off between an administrative-economical 
reasoning and the uncertainty associated con-
cerning future developments of the affairs that 
are the subject of the APA. 
7.8	 Retroactive	Effect	for	APAs
Unilateral rulings cannot have retroactive effect, 
as according to domestic law, ruling requests 
can only be accepted if they concern future 
affairs.
However, as bi- and multilateral APAs have 
another legal basis, said restriction does not 
apply for these agreements. Hence, APAs can, 
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depending on the involved countries, have retro-
active effect. The retroactive reach depends on 
the case at hand and on the restriction that the 
facts of the case have not changed significantly 
over the past years. In practice, the retroac-
tive effect of APAs will usually not be extended 
beyond five years. 
8 .  P E N A LT I E S  A N D 
D O C U M E N TAT I O N
8.1 Transfer Pricing Penalties and 
Defences
Transfer Pricing Penalties
Switzerland does not impose penalties that 
apply specifically in the transfer pricing context, 
except for violations of the CbCR. 
In cases of unlawful tax evasion or tax fraud, 
penalties can nevertheless also be imposed 
concerning transfer pricing issues. This is, in 
particular, true for cases where basic principles 
of transfer pricing were grossly neglected and, 
thus, the violation of the arm’s-length principle 
was not only recognisable for the company or 
the persons in charge respectively but downright 
obvious. 
In the case of tax evasion or tax fraud, penal-
ties may be imposed for all taxes involved. For 
instance, a transfer price-induced adjustment 
by the tax administration concerning corporate 
income tax may trigger respective consequenc-
es regarding withholding tax or VAT. Hence, in 
practice it seems advisable to seek an amicable 
solution with the tax administration as the tax 
administration would then refrain from initiating 
criminal proceedings. Whether this approach is 
actually appropriate requires a careful consid-
eration and assessment of the facts and circum-
stances of the individual case.
Documentation Obligations
Swiss tax laws do not define specific docu-
mentation requirements with respect to trans-
fer pricing. However, taxpayers must provide 
all documents necessary in order to enable the 
tax administration to conduct a proper assess-
ment of the taxable base. This legal obligation 
is based on the principle that the taxpayer and 
the tax administration jointly determine the rel-
evant facts to ensure a complete and correct 
assessment as far as corporate income tax 
is concerned. As a consequence, despite the 
lack of specific documentation rules, taxpayers 
are strongly advised to have full and state-of-
the-art transfer pricing documentation at hand 
that can, if requested by the tax administration, 
be disclosed. This also includes intercompany 
agreements with respect to the controlled trans-
actions. Such documentation will also be helpful 
in the defence of potential tax evasion charges. 
Such documentation should also include sound 
and updated benchmarking studies. 
If no appropriate transfer pricing documentation 
can be presented and the taxable base subse-
quently cannot be properly determined, the tax 
administration might need to estimate the trans-
fer prices. Even though that estimate has to be 
dutiful and based on experience, such estimates 
are rarely in favour of the taxpayer. Although 
such an estimate is not to be considered as a 
penalty, it still has to be taken into consideration 
as a potential negative impact. The reason for 
that is that the courts will reject such an estimate 
only if the taxpayer can demonstrate that the 
transfer prices set by the tax administration are 
obviously flawed or arbitrary. 
Penalty Relief
Federal and cantonal Swiss tax laws provide 
for a one-time voluntary disclosure, which leads 
to a complete penalty relief if specific statutory 
conditions are met. Outside the voluntary dis-
closure procedures, penalties charged are lower 
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in the case of ordinary negligence and higher 
in the case of gross negligence. Collaboration 
with the tax administration in the course of a tax 
criminal investigation will usually result in a lower 
penalty. With regard to the question of culpabil-
ity, the importance of state-of-the-art transfer 
pricing documentation should be emphasised. 
If a company does have such documentation, 
it will be difficult for the tax administrations to 
substantiate culpability. However, as indicated 
above, many disputes can be prevented or set-
tled by negotiations with the tax authorities dur-
ing a tax assessment or tax audit process (by 
filing formal complaints). 
8.2 Taxpayer Obligations under the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
Concerning transfer pricing documentation, 
Switzerland only adopted the minimum stand-
ard. Hence, taxpayers are only required to pre-
pare CbCRs without having the obligation to 
prepare a master or local file. 
However, in view of a potential challenge of the 
transfer prices by the tax authorities, it is none-
theless advisable to have master and local files 
at hand. 
9 .  A L I G N M E N T  W I T H 
O E C D  T R A N S F E R  P R I C I N G 
G U I D E L I N E S
9.1	 Alignment	and	Differences
Though the Guidelines are not implemented 
into domestic law, the administrative practice 
declared the Guidelines as applicable.
Nonetheless, differences exist regarding the 
application of thin capitalisation rules and the 
determination of intra-group interest rates for 
loan receivables and loan payables both in Swiss 
francs and in foreign currencies. In this regard, 
the FTA annually publishes safe haven interest 
rates that deviate from the at arm’s-length prin-
ciple as defined and agreed upon in the OECD’s 
TPG.
In addition, there is a long tradition in Swiss tax 
law of applying the formulary apportionment 
method regarding the profit allocation between 
the Swiss head office of an enterprise and its 
foreign permanent establishments. However, 
the tendency is to apply the OECD authorised 
approach (AOA). 
With regard to the apportionment of profits 
between a head office and foreign permanent 
establishments, the FSC has shown sympathy 
for the application of the AOA in its famous rul-
ing in the matter of Swiss International Airlines, 
but ultimately left the question open. In this 
respect, it should be noted that Switzerland has 
numerous DTAs in force that are still based on 
the OECD Model Convention, where the applica-
tion of the formulary apportionment method for 
the allocation of profits to permanent establish-
ments was considered permissible. 
9.2 Arm’s-Length Principle
Deviations from the arm’s-length principle can 
be seen in the implementation of the patent box 
and the notional interest deduction, which were 
introduced in connection with the corporate tax 
reform that came into force on 1 January 2020.
In line with BEPS Action 5, cantons are allowed 
to exempt income from patents and similar rights 
from taxation up to 90%. The top-down approach 
is used to determine qualifying income. Thereby, 
income from routine activities and trade marks 
is to be excluded. These are subject to ordinary 
taxation. According to the FTHA, it is not neces-
sary to determine the income for routine activi-
ties and brand use by means of transfer pricing 
studies. Instead, for reasons of practicability, 
the law provides for fixed margins. With regard 
to the income of routine functions, a mark-up 
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of cost plus 6% is defined, and concerning the 
income of trade marks, as a rule of thumb, 1% 
of the turnover of the patent box is regarded as 
appropriate. However, the right to prove higher 
or lower income from trade marks based on the 
arm’s-length principle is reserved.
The law also provides for simplifications in con-
nection with the notional interest deduction. 
The special feature of the Swiss notional inter-
est deduction is that it is only possible on the 
so-called security equity. For this purpose, core 
and security equity must be determined in a first 
step. The law does not require the preparation of 
a transfer pricing study for this purpose. 
For reasons of practicability, the regulation 
rather provides for equity backing rates for the 
individual assets, following the circular on thin 
capitalisation and its inversed maximum safe 
haven debt capacity rates (for example, for inter-
company loans, a minimum equity rate of 15% 
is required). If these rates are exceeded, there 
is security capital on which an imputed equity 
interest deduction can be claimed. In general, 
this interest is also not determined on the basis 
of the arm’s-length principle. Rather, the law 
provides for the interest rate for ten-year federal 
bonds. However, to the extent the security capi-
tal is attributable to receivables from related par-
ties, an interest rate corresponding to the arm’s-
length principle may be applied. 
9.3 Impact of BEPS 
In general, it can be noted that the BEPS pro-
ject had a major impact on the Swiss tax law 
landscape. Based on BEPS Action 5, Switzer-
land agreed to spontaneously exchange certain 
tax rulings and based on BEPS Action 13, the 
exchange of country-by-country reports (see 6.1 
Sharing Taxpayer Information). 
Moreover, Switzerland abolished the administra-
tive practices on Swiss finance branches and 
principal companies (see 1.2 Current Regime 
and Recent Changes). The BEPS project con-
siderably raised the awareness of transfer pric-
ing, prompting the tax administrations – at can-
tonal and federal level – to address this issue 
more frequently and persistently (see 1.2 Cur-
rent Regime and Recent Changes). 
9.4 Entities Bearing the Risk of Another 
Entity’s Operations
From a contract and commercial law perspec-
tive, a group can freely allocate risks and func-
tions to be assumed between its entities. With a 
view to the acceptance of such an allocation, the 
FSC held, in favour of the taxpayers, that the tax 
administration must recognise the contractual 
distribution of functions and risks undertaken 
by group entities, if these were not merely sham 
structures.
However, as the tax administrations are also fol-
lowing a substance-over-form approach in the 
area of transfer pricing, the splitting up of the 
assumption of risks and functions is increasingly 
questioned by the tax authorities. In particular, 
the tax administrations will evaluate whether the 
personnel of a risk-bearing entity was effectively 
able to manage and control the assumed risks.
1 0 .  R E L E V A N C E  O F 
T H E  U N I T E D  N AT I O N S 
P R A C T I C A L  M A N U A L  O N 
T R A N S F E R  P R I C I N G
10.1 Impact of UN Practical Manual on 
Transfer Pricing
The UN Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing is 
of only minor importance in Swiss transfer pric-
ing practice.
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1 1 .  S A F E  H A R B O U R S  O R 
O T H E R  U N I Q U E  R U L E S
11.1 Transfer Pricing Safe Harbours
There are safe harbour rules that apply on thin 
capitalisation and on interest rates that are 
regularly used by corporate tax payers (see 9.1 
Alignment	and	Differences). 
Thin Capitalisation
The FTA published thin capitalisation rules in its 
Circular Letter No 6 (6 June 1997). In this circu-
lar, the maximum debt is determined according 
to maximum debt capacity ratios that apply for 
each asset category. No interest expense can 
be made on debt that surpasses this maximum 
debt calculated (to be considered as construc-
tive dividend distribution). Special safe haven 
rules might apply on the level of the Swiss can-
tons (eg, a maximum debt ratio of 6/7 in the can-
ton of Zug). 
Interest Rates
Furthermore, the FTA annually publishes circu-
lar letters providing inbound and outbound safe 
harbour interest rates.
The FTA, in principle, allows taxpayers to devi-
ate from the conditions set out in the above-
mentioned circular letters if the taxpayer can 
prove that the applied interest rate is at arm’s 
length. The tax payer has the burden of proof 
to establish that the applied interest rate is at 
arm’s length. the tax payer preferably does that 
through performing a detailed transfer pricing 
analysis.  
11.2	 Rules	on	Savings	Arising	from	
Operating in the Jurisdiction
Switzerland does not have any specific rules 
relating to location savings and relies on the 
OECD’s TPG on this issue. It is to be noted, 
though, that Switzerland does not provide nota-
ble location savings in the sense of the OECD’s 
TPG as production and labour costs are com-
paratively high.
11.3 Unique Transfer Pricing Rules or 
Practices
Switzerland does not have unique transfer pric-
ing rules and, in principle, adheres to the OECD’s 
TPG.
1 2 .  C O - O R D I N AT I O N  W I T H 
C U S T O M S  V A L U AT I O N
12.1 Co-ordination Requirements 
between Transfer Pricing and Customs 
Valuation
Switzerland levies VAT on imported goods 
(import tax) of currently 7.7%, where the tax is 
assessed on the respective consideration. The 
import tax is levied by the Federal Customs 
Administration, which acts, like the FTA, as an 
independent administrative body of the federal 
government. 
Despite the fact that the FTA and the Federal 
Customs Administration act independently, the 
administrations are entitled and encouraged to 
exchange relevant information between them-
selves and with other interested administra-
tive branches. Accordingly, it can be observed 
that said information exchange has massively 
increased within the past couple of years, which 
is mostly due to improved electronic systems 
allowing a comprehensive and steady data flow. 
Hence, transfer pricing adjustments should 
always be considered for import tax purposes, 
as well. With regard to customs duty purposes, 
it can be noted that generally no adjustment is 
required as the customs duty itself is based on 
weight and not on monetary value. 
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1 3 .  C O N T R O V E R S Y 
P R O C E S S
13.1 Options and Requirements in 
Transfer	Pricing	Controversies
General
Transfer pricing issues can generally be raised 
by the tax administration in the course of the 
ordinary tax assessments or in the course of 
audits. With regard to the transfer pricing contro-
versy process, it has to be differentiated whether 
a cantonal tax administration or the FTA raised 
the issue of transfer pricing. While the cantonal 
tax administrations raise this issue in the context 
of corporate income tax, the FTA may challenge 
transfer pricing also with regard to withholding 
tax, stamp duty or VAT.
As will be shown, taxpayers may challenge the 
results of a tax assessment or from an audit 
firstly in an administrative objection proceeding 
before bringing the case to court. As regards the 
selection of the courts, the taxpayer does not 
have options since the competent courts are 
determined by law.
Corporate Income Tax
Since the cantonal tax administrations are the 
competent authorities to assess and levy cor-
porate income tax at cantonal and federal level, 
transfer pricing adjustments affecting corporate 
income tax have to be discussed with these 
cantonal tax administrations. If the tax admin-
istration has already issued an assessment or 
a decision, an objection can be lodged with the 
tax administration itself within 30 days. The tax 
administration will then have to evaluate the 
material objections and render a new decision.
The tax administration’s second decisions can 
be appealed before court, again within a 30-day 
deadline. Generally, each canton provides two 
judicial instances, whereas, typically, smaller 
cantons only established one judicial instance. 
Once the highest cantonal court has rendered its 
decision, an appeal with the FSC can be lodged, 
also within 30 days. In contrast to the cantonal 
instances, the FSC will only deal with questions 
concerning the correct application of the law, 
which includes the application of the OECD’s 
TPG. Issues concerning the facts will only be 
dealt with if the facts were arbitrarily established. 
The disputed tax needs to be paid irrespective 
of the fact of appealing a decision or moving 
the case forward into court. If the appeal/objec-
tion is successful, the tax already paid will be 
paid back. However, in ruling 5A_41/2018, the 
Supreme Court clarified that the tax administra-
tion is nevertheless not entitled to enforce the 
disputed tax amount as long as the controversy 
has not been decided with legal effect. Never-
theless, the tax authority may request a freezing 
order at any time, even before the tax amount 
has been legally determined, if the taxpayer is 
not domiciled in Switzerland or payment of the 
tax owed by him or her appears to be at risk. 
The freezing order is immediately enforceable 
and has the same effects in the debt collection 
proceedings as an enforceable court judgment.
Withholding Tax, Stamp Duty, VAT
In contrast to the cantonal tax administrations, 
the FTA can also raise transfer pricing issues in 
connection with withholding tax, stamp duty and 
VAT. As at the cantonal level, the taxpayer can 
object against a negative decision of the FTA 
before appealing to the court.
As such a decision affects taxes being levied at 
federal level, the appeal has to be lodged with 
the Swiss Federal Administrative Court within 30 
days. This court’s decision can then be appealed 
with the FSC.
The disputed tax needs to be paid irrespective 
of the fact of appealing a decision or moving 
the case forward into court. If the appeal/objec-
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tion is successful, the tax already paid will be 
paid back. However, in ruling 5A_41/2018, the 
Supreme Court clarified that the tax administra-
tion is nevertheless not entitled to enforce the 
disputed tax amount as long as the controversy 
has not been decided with legal effect. Never-
theless, the tax authority may request a freezing 
order at any time, even before the tax amount 
has been legally determined, if the taxpayer is 
not domiciled in Switzerland or payment of the 
tax owed by him or her appears to be at risk. 
The freezing order is immediately enforceable 
and has the same effects in the debt collection 
proceedings as an enforceable court judgment.
1 4 .  J U D I C I A L  P R E C E D E N T
14.1 Judicial Precedent on Transfer 
Pricing
Due to Switzerland’s practice of issuing transfer 
pricing rulings and its APA programme, disputes 
on core transfer pricing issues that have to be 
settled by courts are relatively rare. Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court has issued some impor-
tant decisions that also raise some key issues in 
the field of transfer pricing. It is already evident 
that transfer pricing will play an important role in 
case law in the future. 
Important cases have been decided in connec-
tion with IP transactions, group financing (in par-
ticular, cash pools), contract manufacturers and 
asset management services. In some cases, the 
rulings deal with transactions involving compa-
nies resident in low-tax jurisdictions. In addition, 
there are various administrative assistance cas-
es arising from transfer pricing audits abroad. 
14.2	 Significant	Court	Rulings
Due to the significant number of rulings in the 
area of transfer pricing, a selection of the most 
important transfer pricing cases decided by the 
FSC in the past four years is presented below.
FSC Decision 2C_11/2018 of 10 December 
2018
This decision marks a tipping point concerning 
the case law of the FSC. The subject of the case 
was a penalty that was imposed for unlawful tax 
evasion due to blatantly disregarding the princi-
ple of dealing at arm’s length. Second, it has to 
be pointed out that this decision concerns pay-
ments to the Netherlands, whereas other cases 
usually concerned offshore tax havens.
The case at hand dealt with a Swiss company 
that is involved in the manufacturing and dis-
tribution of pharmaceutical and chemical prod-
ucts. The Swiss company was held by a Dutch 
parent that held another company in France. The 
R&D activities were delegated by the Dutch par-
ent to its French subsidiary and compensated 
with cost plus 15%. In turn, the Swiss company 
had to pay a royalty to its Dutch parent of 2.5% 
of its turnover for using the R&D results. 
The FSC ruled that the Dutch parent was a mere 
shell company as it had no substance (in 2006 
and 2007, no employees were employed, and in 
2010 and 2011, an average of only three employ-
ees were employed). Hence, the royalty agree-
ment was disregarded. Instead, the R&D agree-
ment between the Dutch parent and the French 
subsidiary was regarded as being directly con-
cluded between the Swiss and French compa-
nies. The tax adjustment therefore amounted to 
the royalty payments minus the cost plus 15% 
remuneration, which equalled a yearly aver-
age adjustment of approximately CHF350,000. 
Whether the latter was in line with the OECD’s 
TPG was not assessed by the FSC. 
With regard to the imposed penalty, the Court 
ruled that it must have been recognisable to the 
persons in charge and that a royalty to the shell 
company that was not entitled to the fruits of the 
R&D activities could obviously not be consid-
ered as a commercially justified expense. Hence, 
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an unlawful tax evasion was confirmed and 75% 
of the evaded tax was imposed as a penalty. 
FSC Decision 2C_343/2019 of 27 September 
2019
This decision concerns a Swiss company that 
offered administration and other services con-
cerning trusts. For this purpose, it held, inter 
alia, an international business company in the 
Seychelles that handled the daily business of 
the administered trusts. The remuneration of the 
Seychelles company was defined in a service 
agreement. In the relevant years (2008–12), the 
Swiss company mainly reported losses. The tax 
administration argued that the remuneration for 
the Seychelles company was not at arm’s length 
and determined the remuneration using the cost 
plus (5%) method. 
According to long-standing case law, the tax 
administration has to prove that the company 
rendered a service for which it was not, or not 
adequately, reimbursed. The taxpayer then has 
to prove that the remuneration was, in fact, 
at arm’s length. The burden of proof is thus 
reversed. 
In case at hand, the plaintiff was not able to pro-
vide proof regarding the payments to its subsidi-
ary being conducted at arm’s length. The plaintiff 
has limited itself to submitting price lists of com-
petitors. However, it was not clear from these 
lists that the transactions in question were actu-
ally free-market transactions to which the intra-
group transactions were comparable. Thus, due 
to the lack of adequate information, the CUP 
method could not be applied. In turn, the FSC 
confirmed the ruling of the lower instances that 
the Seychelles company only executed routine 
functions and did not assume any risk. The cost 
plus 5% remuneration was, hence, confirmed. 
However, in the years 2008 to 2010, only imma-
terial adjustments were made and consumed 
by the tax losses carried forward. In 2011 and 
2012, adjustments were made in the amounts of 
approximately CHF125,000.
This case demonstrates that in the absence of 
transfer pricing analysis documenting the cor-
rect delineation and pricing of the intra-group 
transaction (as outlined in the OECD’s TPG), the 
taxpayer is not in a strong position when facing 
the tax authorities.
FSC Decision 2C_1073/2018 of 20 December 
2019
Contrary to the above-mentioned cases, this 
case dealt with an insufficient remuneration of 
the Swiss company, a bank. Said bank had a 
subsidiary in Guernsey that administered a num-
ber of umbrella funds and received a manage-
ment fee of 1.5% of the net value of the assets 
under management and a performance fee of 
10–20% of the funds’ performance. Even though 
the Guernsey company was contractually 
obliged to administer the funds, these activities 
were delegated to third parties and to the Swiss 
parent. Whereas the third parties as well as the 
Swiss parent received an equal management fee 
(0.75%), only third parties were also entitled to 
a performance fee. The Swiss parent company 
did not receive any retrocessions relating to the 
performance fees. 
The tax administration claimed that 70% of 
the performance fees and a remuneration for 
other activities (eg, marketing and distribution) 
should have been awarded to the Swiss parent. 
In addition, the tax administration imposed a 
fine of 75% of the unlawfully evaded tax con-
cerning the already definitive tax assessments 
(2001–07) and 50% concerning the open ones 
(2008–10). Unfortunately, the effective amounts 
were redacted by the competent courts. 
The FSC confirmed the decision of the last 
cantonal court in the present matter and took 
into consideration that the Guernsey company 
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received management and performance fees 
concerning the funds, the management of which 
it has delegated to third parties and its parent. 
Hence, it could have been assumed that the 
contractual conditions concerning the third-par-
ty services were, in fact, at arm’s length, which, 
according to the FSC, should also have been 
applied in relation to the Swiss parent company. 
1 5 .  F O R E I G N  PAY M E N T 
R E S T R I C T I O N S
15.1 Restrictions on Outbound 
Payments Relating to Uncontrolled 
Transactions
With regard to uncontrolled outbound transac-
tions, Switzerland does not have any specific 
rules or even restrictions.
15.2 Restrictions on Outbound 
Payments Relating to Controlled 
Transactions
With regard to controlled outbound transactions, 
Switzerland does not have any specific rules or 
even restrictions. 
However, as for all transactions, the payments 
have to be commercially justified in order to be 
effectively deductible for corporate income tax 
purposes. Furthermore, according to the FSC, 
a “particularly qualified” duty to co-operate with 
the tax authorities in the case of cross-border 
legal relationships has to be taken into account. 
This increased duty especially applies to out-
bound payments to a non-DTA foreign country 
or to a DTA foreign country to the extent that 
the DTA does not yet meet the current OECD 
standard on information exchange. The rea-
soning is that the circumstances of the foreign 




Switzerland does not have specific rules with 
regard to the effects of other countries’ legal 
restrictions. In the event that a foreign entity is 
affected by an adjustment of a payment to a 
Swiss entity due to such restrictions, a double 
taxation is most likely to incur. 
However, depending on the reasons for the 
adjustments and the status of the assessments, 
Swiss tax authorities may prevent a double taxa-
tion with unilateral measures. If the tax year con-
cerned is already finally assessed, though, the 
conduct of a MAP would probably have to be 
requested. 
1 6 .  T R A N S PA R E N C Y  A N D 
C O N F I D E N T I A L I T Y
16.1 Publication of Information on APAs 
or Transfer Pricing Audit Outcomes
In Switzerland, taxpayer information is kept 
strictly confidential, apart from cases of admin-
istrative assistance with contracting states. 
Thus, results from APAs and transfer pricing 
audits are not published. Data regarding APAs 
is, however, collected for statistical purposes, 
with these statistics limited to the number of 
requested APAs, current APA proceedings and 
closed APA proceedings.
16.2 Use of “Secret Comparables”
In principle, Switzerland adheres to the OECD’s 
TPG and also follows the principle according 
to which the tax administration is prohibited 
to base transfer pricing adjustments on secret 
comparables. 
However, there is not sufficient publicly avail-
able information with respect to transactions 
between unrelated parties in Switzerland, nor is 
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there a public registry where the financial data 
of Swiss companies can be consulted. The lack 
of sufficient publicly available data might, for tax 
administrations, trigger the need for the use of 
secret comparables, at least for audit purposes. 
However, in practice, the tax administrations 
generally accept the use of pan-European data 
and, thus, the problem of limited data can effec-
tively be mitigated.
Although pan-European data that generally pro-
vides a sound base for benchmarking analysis 
can be used, it can be observed in practice that 
tax administrations nevertheless try to stick 
to secret comparables. If this occurs, the tax 
administration needs to disclose the compara-
bles to the taxpayer. 
1 7 .  C O V I D - 1 9
17.1 Impact of COVID-19 on Transfer 
Pricing
The authors expect that COVID-19 will have a 
notable effect on transfer pricing in Switzerland, 
certainly where principal or trading structures 
with the main risk-taking entity in Switzerland 
are faced with a substantial fall in their taxable 
profits in Switzerland. It is expected that the tax 
administrations will monitor transfer prices very 
closely, since the COVID-19 measures heavily 
rely on the state’s finances, as, probably, in all 
countries around the world.
The safe haven interest rates and thin capitalisa-
tion rules have not been adapted in spite of the 
extraordinary financial effects of the COVID-19 
crisis.
17.2	 Government	Response
Regarding the Swiss economy, a large-scale 
financing programme has been rolled out in 
order to support the liquidity needs of com-
panies short of funds. As regards taxpayers, 
the response regarding the implications of the 
COVID-19 pandemic focused on securing the 
taxpayers’ liquidity as far as possible. 
Financing Programme
In record time, the Swiss government and the 
Swiss banks have rolled out an emergency pro-
gramme to provide bridge loans to companies 
against the risk of illiquidity due to the COVID-19 
measures. Affected companies can apply to their 
banks for bridging credit facilities representing a 
maximum of 10% of their annual turnover and 
no more than CHF20 million. In essence, the 
applicants fill out a one-page form with readily 
available information and identification. 
The applicants must meet certain minimum crite-
ria. In particular, the company must declare that 
it is suffering substantial reductions in turnover 
because of the COVID-19 pandemic. For credit 
up to CHF500,000, 0% interest is charged. The 
interest rate on credit exceeding CHF500,000 
is 0.5% per annum on the loan secured by the 
Confederation.
Taxpayers’ Payment Obligations
Temporary waivers concerning federal and, in 
most cases, cantonal taxes were granted and 
payment deadlines were extended. Furthermore, 
with regard to VAT credits, quicker refunds were 
made. These measures correspond with the 
measures recommended by the OECD but were 
only in effect until 31 December 2020. Further-
more, and also in line with the OECD’s recom-
mendations, the deadlines for the filing of tax 
returns were temporarily extended. 
COVID-19 Provision
Four cantons allowed for the booking of a COV-
ID-19 provision regarding the fiscal year 2019. 
However, the FTA made it clear that these provi-
sions will not be accepted regarding the federal 
corporate income tax. The reasoning of the FTA 
is that in Europe in general and in Switzerland in 
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particular, the extent of the COVID-19 pandemic 
only became apparent in early 2020 and, thus, 
after the balance sheet date concerning 2019.
17.3 Progress of Audits
Though the tax administrations were at times 
urged to reduce the physical presence of person-
nel in their offices and partially work from home, 
audits have not stalled but notably slowed down. 
Such audits have been performed electronically 
(desk reviews). 
As practice has shown thus far, tax audits have 
not been conducted in a harsher fashion than 
before the COVID-19 pandemic. On the contrary, 
tax administrations have demonstrated a higher 
willingness to reach amicable solutions at times. 
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national tax law and is recognised as a lead-
ing independent tax boutique. With currently 15 
partners and counsels and a total of approxi-
mately 50 tax experts consisting of attorneys, 
legal experts and economists, the firm advises 
multinational and national corporate clients as 
well as individuals in all tax areas. A central fo-
cus lies on tax controversy and dispute resolu-
tion, including transfer pricing issues. Tax Part-
ner AG also provides support regarding transfer 
pricing studies and the preparation of transfer 
pricing documentation. Other key areas include 
M&A, restructuring, real estate transactions, fi-
nancial products, VAT and customs. Tax Partner 
AG is independent and collaborates with vari-
ous leading tax law firms globally. In 2005 the 
firm was a co-founder of Taxand, the world’s 
largest independent organisation of highly qual-
ified tax experts. 
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Introduction
One of the central motivations behind the 
OECD’s work on the base erosion and profit 
shifting (BEPS) project is the desire to align a 
multinational company’s (MNC’s) profit with val-
ue-creating activities. The project brought about 
significant changes to the OECD Transfer Pric-
ing Guidelines (OECD TPG). Its transfer pricing 
analysis framework explicitly recognises that the 
role of the significant people functions, the criti-
cal business decisions they are making and the 
operational risks they are controlling are leading 
when deciding how transactional results should 
be allocated over entities/jurisdictions. 
Updates of the OECD TPG have been ongoing 
since 2017, covering, amongst others, specific 
guidance on transactions involving intangibles 
(introducing the concept of DEMPE, or devel-
opment, enhancement, maintenance, protection 
and exploitation), business restructurings and 
financial transactions. Most recently, guidance 
on the impact of COVID-19 was issued. 
In addition, there is significantly expanded co-
operation in the field of tax law. The exchange 
of information has been considerably expanded 
with the BEPS project. Not only country-by-
country reporting, but also the spontaneous 
exchange of information, EU Council Directive 
2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 
2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic 
exchange of information in the field of taxation 
in relation to reportable cross-border arrange-
ments (also known under the acronym DAC 6) 
and, last but not least, the exchange of infor-
mation upon request need to be mentioned in 
this regard. Together with simultaneous, bilateral 
and multilateral joint audits, the states have new 
information channels in their hands, which have 
not only led to increased audit activity in the area 
of transfer pricing, but also to the definition of 
transfer pricing audit priorities. 
All these developments have a substantial 
impact on how intercompany transactions are 
analysed by MNCs as well as tax authorities. 
MNCs based in Switzerland are affected differ-
ently by these developments. 
The liberal economic system, in particular the 
liberal labour law, good infrastructure, the first-
class education system as well as the compara-
tively moderate corporate tax burden are reasons 
why Switzerland is a popular location for group 
headquarters and entrepreneurial activities that 
yield high residual profits, despite internation-
ally rather high labour costs. Given this situation, 
it is not surprising that foreign tax authorities 
are particularly interested in intra-group trans-
actions with Swiss companies. But the Swiss 
tax authorities are also increasingly auditing 
transfer prices. The experience of recent years 
and case law show that the Swiss tax authori-
ties make increasing use of the OECD TPG as 
updated in 2017 to review intra-group transac-
tions. Intra-group transactions with companies 
that are domiciled in tax havens or in countries 
with attractive tax regimes are particularly scru-
tinised. 
Current transfer pricing issues also arise in con-
nection with financial transactions and transfer 
pricing adjustments that were made due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
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The increased relevance of transfer pricing issues 
in Switzerland has finally led to new legislative 
developments in the field of dispute resolution. 
Impact of the 2017 Update of the OECD TPG 
on Swiss Practice
The allocation of returns between related par-
ties was previously often based on the prem-
ise that risks and, hence, high-return rewards 
could be contractually allocated to a party in a 
(low-tax) jurisdiction even though that party had 
no significant people functions located in that 
jurisdiction. The 2017 update of the OECD TPG, 
following Actions 8–10 of the BEPS project, now 
stipulates that MNCs will have to identify all eco-
nomically significant risks per transaction and to 
determine which party of each transaction con-
trols the risks (ie, which party makes the deci-
sions to take on, lay off and mitigate such risks) 
when defining the transfer pricing methodology. 
The contractual arrangement is still the starting 
point of a transfer pricing analysis, but when not 
aligned with actual allocation of the functional 
control of risks, the latter will lead in deciding on 
the transfer pricing outcome. 
The 2017 update of the OECD TPG also intro-
duced the DEMPE analysis as a new way of 
dealing with transactions involving intangibles. 
The DEMPE analysis, also stemming from the 
same effort of creating a clear link between 
economic substance and profit recognised in 
a jurisdiction, required responses to the ques-
tions regarding who within the MNC undertakes 
and, more importantly, who controls the DEMPE 
functions of the intangibles under review, and 
who bears the relative risks and owns the asso-
ciated assets. The MNC should not only con-
sider what meaning and relative importance 
can be attributed to the DEMPE functions in its 
particular industry and company structure but 
also needs to establish the location of the func-
tions and their relative significance. After having 
delineated the intangible related transaction, the 
pricing of these transactions needs to be deter-
mined. 
Additionally, the OECD TPG updated the sec-
tions on business restructurings. The actual 
transactions, including the accurate delineation 
of the transactions comprising the business 
restructuring and the functions, assets and risks 
before and after the restructuring will need to be 
determined. If something of value is transferred 
from one group entity to another in that business 
restructuring transaction, the pricing needs to be 
established in line with the arm’s-length princi-
ple; more specifically, a transfer of something of 
value will require an assessment under transfer 
pricing business restructuring provisions and the 
“options realistically available” to the transferor 
will need to be considered.
The above-mentioned 2017 updates to the 
2010 OECD TPG were generally considered a 
mere clarification of existing principles rather 
than a revision of the guidelines and therefore 
had immediate impact. The authors observed 
soon after that, in structures involving Swiss 
entities, the tax authorities started to require 
the taxpayers in tax audits, litigation, advance 
pricing agreements (APAs) and mutual agree-
ment procedures (MAPs) to substantiate their 
position using analytical frameworks as they 
were explained above and laid down in the 2017 
OECD TPG. One important consequence of the 
BEPS project in general and the 2017 update 
in particular was that over the past few years, 
taxpayers have, as part of their transfer pricing 
risk management and under pressure from the 
tax authorities, unwound structures lacking the 
necessary substance and/or adjusted the trans-
fer pricing approaches.
Controlled Transactions with Low-Taxed 
Companies
The increased awareness of transfer pricing 
issues is also reflected in the way the Swiss 
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tax authorities deal with controlled transac-
tions between Swiss companies and low-taxed 
foreign companies. Whereas in the past the 
tax authorities examined offshore companies 
primarily from the perspective of the place of 
effective management or general anti-avoidance 
rules, today the focus is more on transfer prices. 
This is evidenced by a look at recent Federal 
Supreme Court rulings in which transfer prices 
in the financial services industry were put to the 
test.
In its ruling of 27 September 2019 (2C_343/2019), 
the Supreme Court had to deal with a Gene-
va-based company, A SA, that belonged to 
an internationally active private bank and pro-
vided activities related to the management and 
administration of trusts and companies, as well 
as related advice and services. A SA held 99% 
of the shares in A Ltd, a company domiciled in 
the Seychelles. Under a service agreement with 
A SA, A Ltd was responsible for the registration 
and management of companies, the represen-
tation of companies before local authorities in 
the Seychelles and co-ordination services. A SA 
wanted to support the transfer prices it paid by 
the application of a comparable uncontrolled 
price (CUP) method. For this purpose, it submit-
ted excerpts from websites showing the prices 
charged by competitors.
The tax administration of the Canton of Geneva 
considered the Seychelles company to be ren-
dering routine functions. Applying the cost plus 
method, A Ltd was allowed a compensation of 
5% of the expenses. A Ltd’s profit, reduced by 
this compensation, was therefore allocated to 
A SA. In addition, a fine was imposed on A SA, 
which amounted to three quarters of the unlaw-
fully avoided taxes. The Federal Supreme Court 
confirmed the decision of the tax administra-
tion. In its ruling, it highlighted several important 
points to be considered in the administrative and 
judicial review of transfer pricing.
According to the Federal Supreme Court, the 
OECD TPG are also applicable to transactions 
with offshore companies that are not resident 
in a double taxation agreement country. The 
version applicable should be the one that was 
current at the time of the taxation periods. Pur-
suant to the Federal Supreme Court, this was 
the version published in 2010, although the audit 
conducted by the administration also concerned 
the tax periods 2008 to 2009. 
The Federal Supreme Court reiterated that the 
tax authority has to prove that the remunera-
tion paid by A SA was not proportionate to the 
services provided by A Ltd. However, if the tax 
authority provides sufficient evidence that such 
a mismatch exists, it is then up to the taxpayer 
to prove the validity of its own standpoint.
The Federal Supreme Court concluded that – 
taking into account the functional and risk analy-
sis, which showed that the subsidiary only pro-
vided services with little added value and that 
the risks in relation to the clients were borne 
by A SA, and the fact that A SA nevertheless 
repeatedly incurred losses – the lower court 
was entitled to reverse the burden of proof. The 
comparable prices presented by A SA were not 
sufficient to prove to the court their alignment 
with the CUP method. According to the Federal 
Supreme Court, A SA would have had to prove 
on the basis of a comparability analysis – in 
which, according to the OECD, five comparabil-
ity factors have to be taken into account – that 
the transactions used were, in fact, uncontrolled 
transactions to which the intra-group transac-
tions were comparable. 
The case reveals two important findings that 
are also relevant for other transfer pricing 
audits in Switzerland: the functional analysis, 
together with the comparison of the profit mar-
gins achieved by the companies involved in the 
transaction can be used by the tax authorities as 
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an indication that the agreed transfer prices do 
not stand up to the arm’s-length comparison. If 
the company examined by the transfer pricing 
audit now wants to prove that the transfer prices 
are nevertheless at arm’s length, it must use a 
properly documented comparability analysis to 
show that the transactions used in the bench-
mark analysis are actually comparable, other-
wise they will not be accepted as evidence by 
the tax authorities.
In another ruling, issued on 20 December 2019 
(2C_1073/2018, 2C_1089/2018), the Federal 
Supreme Court had to decide on the arm’s-
length conformity of asset management services 
provided by the Geneva-based asset manage-
ment company A SA to C Ltd, a Guernsey-based 
subsidiary. The latter acted as manager of vari-
ous investment funds and was responsible, inter 
alia, for determining the investment strategies, 
distributing the fund interests or managing the 
fund assets on behalf of the investors. For its 
activities, C Ltd received a fixed fee based on 
the net asset value of the assets under manage-
ment and a performance fee. The management 
activities, however, were partially delegated to 
third parties and to A SA itself. 
In the course of a transfer pricing audit con-
cerning A SA, the following issues arose. First, 
should A SA have received 70% of the perfor-
mance fees received by A Ltd for its advisory 
activities, as was the case with certain third par-
ties to which C Ltd delegated its services? Sec-
ondly, should A SA also have received an order 
placement fee for all funds for which it provided 
investment advice? Thirdly, should A SA have 
received remuneration for its sales and market-
ing activities over the entire period covered by 
the proceedings and how should this have been 
determined?
With regard to the issue of the performance fees 
paid to A SA, the Federal Supreme Court could 
refer to internal comparables. These transactions 
with unrelated parties to which C Ltd delegated 
investment advisory activities demonstrated that 
these parties received a performance fee of 40 to 
70% of the performance fee C Ltd itself received 
from its clients. Thus, the tax administration 
was entitled to assume that a deemed dividend 
existed. The question was now whether the tax 
authority had the right to base the adjustment on 
the highest value; ie, 70%. The Federal Supreme 
Court supported the tax authority’s view based 
on a comparability analysis. The court found that 
A SA’s activities were more extensive than those 
of the third parties. 
Concerning the compensation for the order 
placement activities, it was disputed whether a 
remuneration of 0.09% of the net assets under 
management was due for A SA’s advisory activi-
ties, especially in connection with funds of funds. 
The contract between C Ltd and A SA only pro-
vided a fee for order placing regarding the man-
agement of simple funds. The lower courts disre-
garded this contractual provision without relying 
on a comparability analysis or at least providing 
a coherent explanation. The Federal Supreme 
Court, however, concluded that the lower courts 
had not established why A SA – contrary to the 
contractual agreement – should have received 
remuneration for order placement activities con-
cerning funds of funds. 
With respect to the sales and marketing activi-
ties of A SA, the tax audit revealed that A SA 
was heavily involved in the sales and marketing 
activities of C Ltd in various respects. In order 
to measure the compensation for the sales and 
marketing activities, the tax authority relied on a 
list of 40 external comparables from 2013 and 
2014, although the tax periods examined were 
2003 to 2010. Based on the figures in this table, 
compensation ranged from 26.9% (lower quar-
tile) to 58.92% (upper quartile with a median of 
54.96%) of the management fee. To be conserv-
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ative and to account for market volatility, the tax 
authority set the transfer price for sales and mar-
keting activities at 40% of the management fee. 
It is now of importance for practice that the Fed-
eral Supreme Court did not conclude that the 
administration acted unlawfully solely due to 
the fact that the tax authority took comparative 
values from 2013 and 2014. A SA should have 
specifically explained why the figures from 2013 
and 2014 led to a disproportionate compensa-
tion of A SA. However, it failed to do so.
Like in the first case, the Federal Supreme Court 
affirmed the presence of criminal tax evasion. 
The Federal Supreme Court confirmed that a 
tax evasion is generally to be assumed if the 
reported earnings are the result of a violation of 
the accounting regulations. Further, the Federal 
Supreme Court also held that the violation of 
the arm’s-length principle may constitute a tax 
evasion even if no violation of the accounting 
regulations occurred. This was the case because 
A SA was not sufficiently remunerated, which, 
according to the court, had to be evident to the 
responsible managers.
The two Federal Court rulings presented are 
not isolated cases. The practice of recent years 
shows that the Swiss tax authorities have obvi-
ously targeted controlled transactions between 
Swiss companies and foreign low-taxed com-
panies. 
When analysing these cases, it becomes appar-
ent that the Swiss tax authorities and courts are 
continuously expanding their know-how in the 
area of transfer pricing. The tax authorities are 
also not reluctant to conduct criminal tax inves-
tigations, especially in connection with offshore 
companies. In the case of transactions between 
Swiss companies and those domiciled in low-
tax countries, it is therefore also important in 
Switzerland to clearly regulate transfer prices in 
contracts and to back them up with OECD-con-
forming transfer pricing analyses. Due to recent 
rulings by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, the 
Swiss tax authorities are particularly careful to 
check whether the contractually agreed rights 
and obligations are actually exercised. If not, 
there is a risk that the tax authorities will ignore 
the contracts and challenge the applied transfer 
pricing approach. 
Financial Transactions
Recognising that financial transactions are com-
plex transactions, the OECD published its Trans-
fer Pricing Guidance on Financial Transactions 
(TPG FT) on 11 February 2020, which is now part 
of the OECD TPG. The OECD report covered the 
transfer pricing aspects of various intercompany 
finance transactions, such as loans, financial 
guarantees, cash pooling, hedging and cap-
tive insurance companies. The OECD now pro-
vides detailed guidance supporting taxpayers as 
well as tax authorities in analysing shareholder 
loans and in determining arm’s-length interest 
rates. The TPG FT confirms that in the process 
of determining an arm’s-length interest rate, the 
characteristics of loan instruments – such as 
credit risks, the term of the loan or the level of 
seniority – are relevant factors to be considered 
and the TPG FT provides a detailed analytical 
framework to accurately delineate and price 
intercompany loan transactions.
In this context, it is interesting to review the sta-
tus of the circular letters containing the Swiss 
inbound and outbound safe harbour interest 
rates (one for loans denominated in Swiss francs 
and one for loans denominated in foreign curren-
cies), which the Swiss Federal Tax Administra-
tion publishes by circular every year. 
These circular letters play an important role in 
determining interest rates on intra-group loans, 
reducing the administrative burden of taxpayers 
resulting from preparing and maintaining transfer 
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pricing documentation for their intra-group loans. 
However, the circular letters do not differentiate 
the interest rate applied based on the character-
istics of loan instruments. Therefore, relying on 
the safe harbour interest rates in cross-border 
intra-group loan transactions will likely lead to 
challenges by the other country’s tax authorities, 
claiming that the Swiss safe harbour rates do 
not correspond with the arm’s-length standard. 
Furthermore, within the setting of the EU, rely-
ing on the Swiss safe harbour interest rates may 
lead to additional DAC 6 reporting requirements.
First Experiences with the COVID-19 
Pandemic Guidance
On 18 December 2020, the OECD published the 
OECD’s Guidance on the transfer pricing impli-
cations of the COVID-19 pandemic (the “Guid-
ance”). The Guidance focuses on the following 
four priority issues: 
• comparability analysis; 
• allocation of losses; 
• the allocation of COVID-19-specific costs and 
government assistance programmes; and 
• APAs. 
The Guidance was not intended to replace or 
amend what is already included in the OECD 
TPG, but rather to illustrate the application of 
the arm’s-length principle in the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
MNCs with centralised business models have 
used Switzerland historically as their home for an 
“entrepreneurial entity” or “risk-bearing entity” 
that has both the management and the finan-
cial capacity to bear risk and should receive the 
residual profit or bear the residual losses related 
to the relevant intra-group transactions. These 
entities conduct transactions with entities that 
are performing “routine” functions, they are 
characterised as “limited risk entities” (exposed 
to less risks) and therefore they earn a more sta-
ble return. 
The MNCs would typically aim to set the inter-
company pricing of the routine entity through 
the transactional net margin method (TNMM). In 
applying the TNMM, the net profit of the routine 
or limited risk entity is expressed as a reason-
able profit margin over costs, sales or assets 
employed. Benchmarking studies are performed 
using public databases to identify the profit mar-
gins of independent companies with a compa-
rable functionality of similar companies based 
on certain quantitative and qualitative search 
criteria. A statistical interquartile range (IQR) is 
applied to the financial results of comparable 
companies to obtain the arm’s-length range of 
profit margins. 
One of the most critical questions on the table of 
MNCs with Swiss entrepreneurial entities during 
the COVID-19 pandemic has been: “Can entities 
operating under limited risk arrangements incur 
losses?” The prompt input from the OECD on 
this issue has been highly appreciated from the 
business community.
At the heart of the OECD response, the con-
cepts of “control over risks” (CoR) coupled with 
the concept of “options realistically available” 
(ORA) can be found. The Guidance has made 
clear that reacting correctly to this issue – ie, 
deciding whether or not to share losses with the 
limited risk entity – requires an analytical review 
following the CoR and ORA concepts, whereby 
consistency with long-term transfer pricing poli-
cies cannot be overlooked. 
In the Swiss practice, the authors have experi-
enced that cantonal tax authorities are willing to 
discuss specific cases; for example, where the 
Swiss entrepreneurial entity was incurring (sub-
stantial) losses as a result of COVID-19. They 
accepted that position, but required the taxpayer 
30
TRENDS	AND	DEVELOPMENTS	 SWITZERLAND
Contributed by: René Matteotti and Hendrik Blankenstein, Tax Partner AG 
to explain its business case and – in reference to 
the Guidance – provide the reasoning why it was 
in line with the arm’s-length principle that the 
Swiss entrepreneurial entity had been allocated 
a substantial part of these losses.
Outlook
The trend is clear: transfer pricing issues will 
keep on gaining importance in Switzerland in the 
coming years. In order to counteract the threat 
of double taxation, it is important that dispute 
resolution mechanisms are strengthened. Swit-
zerland has taken important steps in this regard. 
In its international tax policy, it advocates the 
inclusion of arbitration clauses. 
After Switzerland had already concluded a 
consultation agreement with Germany on the 
implementation of arbitration proceedings in 
2016, further agreements with Norway, the 
United States and Australia were added in 2019 
and 2020. These agreements lay down the rel-
evant procedural provisions for the conduct of 
arbitration proceedings. They are based on the 
so-called final arbitration method. Under this 
method, the competent authority of each con-
tracting state must submit a proposal for a deci-
sion to the arbitration panel. In the course of its 
decision-making process, the arbitration panel 
has to decide in favour of one of the two submit-
ted proposals. 
The procedure is efficient in the sense that com-
petent authorities will likely take reasonable posi-
tions when establishing their final offer, knowing 
that a less reasonable offer implies a higher risk 
of being denied during arbitration. This leads 
to a convergence of positions and provides an 
ideal incentive to the competent tax authorities 
to reach a mutual agreement, even before the 
arbitration procedure is initiated.
In addition to that, the Swiss legislator is com-
mitted to strengthen the rights and obligations of 
the taxpayer with respect to MAPs. Surprisingly, 
there is currently no legal basis in this respect. 
This is about to change: Parliament is discuss-
ing the Federal Law on the Implementation of 
International Agreements, which will regulate the 
application and the conduct of MAPs as well as 
the implementation of mutual agreement resolu-
tion into domestic law. The law is also to apply 
mutatis mutandis to APAs. 
According to the current state of discussions, 
the right to be heard in the MAP is to be guar-
anteed as far as possible. Switzerland thus goes 
much further than other states: in particular, the 
persons requesting a MAP or an APA should 
also be able to comment on so-called position 
papers drafted by the “competent authorities”. 
Although Switzerland rejects joint audits, the 
draft provides that the State Secretariat for 
Financial Matters may, with the consent of the 
person making the request, conduct an inspec-
tion together with the competent authority if this 
serves to establish the facts of the case. 
Finally, the proposal explicitly stipulates that 
compensation payments within the scope of 
“secondary adjustments”, which Swiss com-
panies have to pay to foreign group companies 
as a consequence of foreign profit adjustments, 
should not be subject to federal withholding tax, 
provided that such compensation payments are 
made as a consequence of a mutual agreement 
or a domestic resolution. Under current practice, 
the imposition of withholding tax was waived 
only if a mutual agreement was reached. If the 
bill becomes law in its current form – which is to 
be expected – Switzerland will have robust inter-
nal regulations for international dispute resolu-
tion and dispute prevention, which will further 
strengthen its position as a business location.
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Tax Partner AG is focused on Swiss and inter-
national tax law and is recognised as a lead-
ing independent tax boutique. With currently 15 
partners and counsels and a total of approxi-
mately 50 tax experts consisting of attorneys, 
legal experts and economists, the firm advises 
multinational and national corporate clients as 
well as individuals in all tax areas. A central fo-
cus lies on tax controversy and dispute resolu-
tion, including transfer pricing issues. Tax Part-
ner AG also provides support regarding transfer 
pricing studies and the preparation of transfer 
pricing documentation. Other key areas include 
M&A, restructuring, real estate transactions, fi-
nancial products, VAT and customs. Tax Partner 
AG is independent and collaborates with vari-
ous leading tax law firms globally. In 2005 the 
firm was a co-founder of Taxand, the world’s 
largest independent organisation of highly qual-
ified tax experts.
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multinationals with disputes in complex cases. 
René also routinely provides legal opinions to 
governmental agencies and business 
associations on complex tax law issues. He is 
a Tax Chapter member of EXPERTsuisse, the 
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the Joint Tax Committee of the German, 
Austrian and Swiss Tax Expert Associations; 
editor-in-chief of the Swiss tax journal ASA; 
and president of the Swiss Association of Tax 
Law Professors. René is widely published, has 
authored books and numerous academic 
articles in the field of tax law and regularly 
lectures at conferences in Switzerland and 
abroad.
Hendrik Blankenstein is a 
counsel of Tax Partner AG and 
leads its transfer pricing team. 
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worked as an international tax 
consultant at Big Four firms in 
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to 2004 as an in-house international tax and 
transfer pricing counsel at Nestlé’s HQ in 
Switzerland and from 2005 to 2015 as a 
Swiss-based partner in globally operating 
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advice to Swiss and foreign multinational 
clients in a variety of industries, covering 
design of transfer pricing systems, preparation 
of master and local file documentation, 
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management of complex transfer pricing audits 
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